### Case

Conditionality eliminates an ethic of accountability necessary for empowering non-white bodies – reject the negative for their performative guerilla tactics.

Collins, 90 (Patricia Hill, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, Former head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Cincinnati, and the past President of the American Sociological Association Council, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment, p. 62-65)

A second component of the ethic of caring concerns the appropriateness of emotions in dialogues. Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an argument. Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: "Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty I’m trying to change the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as distinct faculties." The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal expressiveness heals this either/or dichotomous rift separating emotion and intellect. For example, in her rendition of "Strange Fruit," Billie Holiday’s lyrics blend seamlessly with the emotion of her delivery to render a trenchant social commentary on southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha Franklin’s cry for "respect" would be virtually meaningless. A third component of the ethic of caring involves developing the capacity for empathy. Harriet Jones, a 16-year-old Black woman, explains to her interviewer why she chose to open up to him: "Some things in my life are so hard for me to bear, and it makes me feel better to know that you feel sorry about those things and would change them if you could." Without her belief in his empathy, she found it difficult to talk. Black women writers often explore the growth of empathy as part of an ethic of caring. For example, the growing respect that the Black slave woman Dessa and the white woman Rufel gain for one another in Sherley Anne William’s Dessa Rose stems from their increased understanding of each other’s positions. After watching Rufel fight off the advances of a white man, Dessa lay awake thinking: "The white woman was subject to the same ravishment as me; this the thought that kept me awake. I hadn’t knowed white mens could use a white woman like that, just take her by force same as they could with us." As a result of her newfound empathy, Dessa observed, "it was like we had a secret between us." These components of the ethic of caring: the value placed on individual expressiveness, the appropriateness of emotions, and the capacity for empathy-pervade African-American culture. One of the best examples of the interactive nature of the importance of dialogue and the ethic of caring in assessing knowledge claims occurs in the use of the call-and-response discourse mode in traditional Black church services. In such services both the minister and the congregation routinely use voice rhythm and vocal inflection to convey meaning. The sound of what is being said is just as important as the words themselves in what is, in a sense, a dialogue of reason and emotion. As a result it is nearly impossible to filter out the strictly linguistic-cognitive abstract meaning from the sociocultural psychoemotive meaning. While the ideas presented by a speaker must have validity (i.e., agree with the general body of knowledge shared by the Black congregation), the group also appraises the way knowledge claims are presented. There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women’s experience as well. Certain dimensions of women’s ways of knowing bear striking resemblance to Afrocentric expressions of the ethic of caring. Belenky et al. point out that two contrasting epistemological orientations characterize knowing: one an epistemology of separation based on impersonal procedures for establishing truth and the other, an epistemology of connection in which truth emerges through care. While these ways of knowing are not gender specific, disproportionate numbers of women rely on connected knowing. The emphasis placed on expressiveness and emotion in African-American communities bears marked resemblance to feminist perspectives on the importance of personality in connected knowing. Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because they see personality as biasing those ideas. In contrast, connected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding. The significance of individual uniqueness, personal expressiveness, and empathy in African-American communities thus resembles the importance that some feminist analyses place on women’s "inner voice." The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute. White women may have access to a women’s tradition valuing emotion and expressiveness, but few Eurocentric institutions except the family validate this way of knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Afrocentric tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in searching for Afrocentric models of masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity imposed on them. The differences among race/gender groups thus hinge on differences in their access to institutional supports valuing one type of knowing over another. Although Black women may be denigrated within white-male-controlled academic institutions, other institutions, such as Black families and churches, which encourage the expression of Black female power, seem to do so, in part, by way of their support for an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. The Ethic of Personal Accountability An ethic of personal accountability is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. Not only must individuals develop their knowledge claims through dialogue and present them in a style proving their concern for their ideas, but people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. Zilpha Elaw’s description of slavery reflects this notion that every idea has an owner and that the owner’s identity matters: "Oh, the abominations of slavery! ... Every case of slavery, however lenient its infliction and mitigated its atrocities, indicates an oppressor, the oppressed, and oppression." For Elaw abstract definitions of slavery mesh with the concrete identities of its perpetrators and its victims. African-Americans consider it essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s character, values, and ethics. African-Americans reject the Eurocentric, masculinist belief that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is outside the boundaries of discussion. Rather, all views expressed and actions taken are thought to derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal. "Does Aretha really believe that Black women should get ‘respect, or is she just mouthing the words?" is a valid question in an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures. An example drawn from an undergraduate course composed entirely of Black women which I taught might help to clarify the uniqueness of this portion of the knowledge validation process. During one class discussion I asked the students to evaluate a prominent Black male scholar’s analysis of Black feminism. Instead of severing the scholar from his context in order to dissect the rationality of his thesis, my students demanded facts about the author’s personal biography. They were especially interested in concrete details of his life, such as his relationships with Black women, his marital status, and his social class background. By requesting data on dimensions of his personal life routinely excluded in positivist approaches to knowledge validation, they invoked concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. They used this information to assess whether he really cared about his topic and drew on this ethic of caring in advancing their knowledge claims about his work. Furthermore, they refused to evaluate the rationality of his written ideas without some indication of his personal credibility as an ethical human being. The entire exchange could only have occurred as a dialogue among members of a class that had established a solid enough community to employ an alternative epistemology in assessing knowledge claims. The ethic of personal accountability is clearly an Afrocentric value, but is it feminist as well? While limited by its attention to middle-class, white women, Carol Gilligan’s work suggests that there is a female model for moral development whereby women are more inclined to link morality to responsibility, relationships, and the ability to maintain social ties. If this is the case, then African-American women again experience a convergence of values from Afrocentric and female institutions. The use of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in traditional Black church services illustrates the interactive nature of all four dimensions and also serves as a metaphor for the distinguishing features of an Afrocentric feminist way of knowing. The services represent more than dialogues between the rationality used in examining bible texts and stories and the emotion inherent in the use of reason for this purpose. The rationale for such dialogues involves the task of examining concrete experiences for the presence of an ethic of caring. Neither emotion nor ethics is subordinated to reason. Instead, emotion, ethics, and reason are used as interconnected, essential components in assessing knowledge claims. In an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim. Alternative knowledge claims in and of themselves are rarely threatening to conventional knowledge. Such claims are routinely ignored, discredited, or simply absorbed and marginalized in existing paradigms, Much more threatening is the challenge that alternative epistemologies offer to he basic process used by the powerful to legitimate their knowledge claims. If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model become suspect. An alternative epistemology challenges all certified knowledge and opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s standpoint using an Afrocentric feminist epistemology calls into question the content of what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of arriving at the truth.

### 2AC FW MAIN

Aff prerequisite to solve warming – war metaphor makes environmental change impossible.

Audebrand, ‘10 [Luc K. Audebrand, (PhD, HEC Montreal), assistant professor of strategic management and organizational behavior in the Faculty of Management at the University of British Columbia, Kelowna Campus; “Sustainability in Strategic Management Education: The Quest for New Root Metaphors”, Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2010, Volume 9, Issue 3]

Romaine (1996) examined the role played by metaphorical thought in the discussion of key environmental issues, such as global warming and loss of biodiversity. Some results suggest dramatic images of war. She found a general depiction of an escalating conflict between growth and the environment that makes some environmentalists feel [sic] the need to “fight environmental threats” before it is too late. For some environmentalists, World War III has already begun, and this time it is being waged against the Earth, with the survival of the human species at stake (Romaine, 1996). The author also notes the stunning similarities between the discourse of environmentalists (e.g., to stop pollution) and that of political leaders (e.g., arguments used to justify the Gulf War). She also remarks that even the Greenpeace boat was called Rainbow Warrior. Likewise, the pressure group Friends of the Earth seems to exist by virtue of its metaphorical opposition to those perceived as the Earth’s enemies, as if they were opposing armies on a physical battlefield (Romaine, 1996: 178). There must be a more appropriate way to connect sustainability with strategic management than the customary war metaphor, since war is often wasteful (e.g., in human and material resources) and chaotic (e.g., civil war, refugee camps, collateral damages), two characteristics that sustainable development proponents try to avoid. Moreover, the war metaphor assumes an enemy and the need for belligerent opposition, which may short-circuit other possible frames of reference for a given situation, including frames required for open dialogues or consensus-seeking discussions on common goals (e.g., carbon emissions reduction target). In short, environmentalists and other proponents of sustainability are now being challenged “to replace their doomsday discourse with an imaginative, inspirational, and future-oriented one” (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007: 2).

Plan-focus teaches flawed decisionmaking – the government is a bad role-model.

Hafner, ‘7 [Ferdinand Hafner, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; “COGNITIVE BIASES AND STRUCTURAL FAILURES IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: EXPLAINING DECISION-MAKING DISSONANCE IN PHASE IV POLICY AND PLANS FOR IRAQ”; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2007]

B. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS In this model, foreign policy decisions are not based on the most optimal solution to achieve national interests. Instead, they are based on the most optimal outcome for the organization. Structural features of organizations are the variables that explain decision making and resultant organizational options to address policy issues. These features consist of rules, standard operating procedures, roles, and organizational relationships. Standard operating procedures, for example, explain whether decisions are made in a hierarchical or flat organizational system. Standard operating procedures also explain how routine processes such as information processing and communications influence decision making. Allison states that rules and “parochial priorities such as group pressures and the tenure of individuals,” also impact the decision-making process.21 The most important structural feature of organizations is authority and control, conceptualized as leadership functions, which influence organization roles and relationships. It is human action that affects changes to all other structural features influencing the decision-making process.22 Leaders hold the power to make and influence decisions through their control over the subordinates that produce policy options from within the unit.23 Organizations are social systems, with defined rules of behavior and relationships predicated on one’s position in the organization and its environment. The national security system is one example of a social system. Leaders, particularly in hierarchical and centralized decision-making systems, affect the behavior of organizations and decision outputs because of the strong role of positional authority over units and individuals. There is a pecking order of who reports to whom, who gives direction, and who takes direction.24 The career civil servants who are subordinate to their politically appointed leaders play an important role because of their indirect connection to the president through their unit leader and their ability to produce decision outputs that can directly impact presidential decisions.25 The organizational perspective also explains how various applications of leadership functions change the decision-making dynamic. The traditional approach views foreign policy decisions as organizational outputs requiring presidential action. The president may delegate decisional authority to subordinate leaders, however, empowering them to make foreign policy decisions that address national interests. Organization leaders, by virtue of their role or title, may also command considerable influence on the decision-making process so that foreign policy decisions have already been made by an organization’s leader instead of as a policy option influencing the president’s decision.28 Whether it is a unit output requiring presidential decisions or delegated authority and control to a unit, organizations and the decision makers that lead them, not the state, are the decisional units.29 C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS According to this perspective, it is unrealistic to believe that the formulation of foreign policy and national security decisions occur without the influence of bureaucracies and individual agendas. Peter Gourevitch states that decisions are derived from ideas, and for an idea to win approval it must “acquire power.”30 The process by which an idea wins approval in the form of a decision and course of action entails a competition against other agendas. Ideas are influenced by both human and resource constraints, and it is these various forms of power that are captured under the concept of the bureaucratic politics paradigm. For example, Gourevitch states that bureaucratic competition requires “the support of various power rivals: money (budgets), arms, or institutions.”31 Institutions and individuals compete to perpetuate organization or group ideas that result in decisions favoring political goals. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin characterize decision making in bureaucracies as the “pulling and hauling” that occurs between various power brokers as the struggle to have agendas (ideas) acquire political power; it is the power required to win presidential approval for a course of action over other choices.32 Unlike the rational actor model, decisions and courses of action are not rational choices that are agreed on by decision makers and influenced by purposeful behavior between states. Allison and Halperin argue that foreign policy is and can be influenced by threats from the international system, but national security decisions are influenced by differences, not rational choices, between “domestic, organizational, and personal interests.”33 Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy outcomes are interdependent. In the bureaucratic politics perspective, positional power plays a significant role in how agendas get carried out as presidential decisions. For example, the Secretary of Defense, in general, wields more power than the Secretary of State. This is not to say that individuals with positional power can monopolize the decision-making process. No one individual can always win, and bureaucratic politics is a give-and-take process, where decisions are based on compromise, relinquishing certain aspects of one’s own personal position to achieve buy-in and approval from the larger group (bureaucracy) involved in the formulation of policy and decision making.34 Individuals do have their own ideas of foreign policy outcomes, but achieving a decision requires building consensus and negotiating comprises that result in a bargaining outcome. The process is neither an individual nor a unitary action. Gourevitch states that “majorities have to be built, coalitions constructed, and legitimating arguments developed.”35 Decision making in the bureaucratic politics paradigm, is a political or government action, not an individual action. D. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE Robert Jervis states that “it is impossible to explain crucial foreign policy decisions without reference to policy makers’ beliefs about the world and the motives of the actors in it.”36 An individual level of analysis approach to national decision making explains how state leaders use beliefs and images from their past and the present-day environment to make future decisions. The study of decision making through cognitive psychology explains how the use of cognitive shortcuts distorts a rational decisionmaking process. Alexander George states that individuals develop, over time, “beliefs, images, and social constructs about their physical and social environment.”37 Individuals display a natural tendency to frame decisions based on data that resonates with one’s environment. The potential consequence is marginalizing factual information, impeding the consideration of rational policy objectives. The reliance by individuals on personal belief systems and images of their environment is the tendency of the mind to make order out of new information, consistent with known beliefs.38 As a result, personal beliefs can affect the quality of foreign policy when they dominate the policy process by limiting the consideration of multiple courses of action.

### ---2AC T Version - Rana

#### Solely procedural solutions backfire and teach unrealistic advocacy.

Rana, ’11 [Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/>]

Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis. After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action. More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices. As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches. Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.” The hope – returned to by constitutional scholars for decades – has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the post September 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner – buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics. As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments. Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge – its strengths and limitations – have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature.

### 2AC

#### Perm – vote aff and endorse all non-competitive parts of the alternative.

#### Perm solves – must experiment to find methods of subversion – totalizing conceptions of the “global capitalist system” doom alt solvency.

Connolly, ‘11 [William Connolly, 2011, review quotes of his book “a world of becoming”, <http://obsoletematter.wordpress.com/2011/07/06/william-connolly-a-world-of-becoming/>]

Specific cultural priorities, habits of family life, religious belief and ritual, underground markets, new social movements, tax evasion,cross-state political formations, military reticence or adventurism, media humor and drama, scientific research and teaching all posses partial and shifting degrees of autonomy from system governance. To insist that every practice, once capitalism expands its reach, is entirely absorbed into its orbit is to translate the idea of a world-capitalist system into that of a totality. Such an image exaggerates the absorptive power of one system, and discourages exploration of ways to stretch and challenge global capitalism in creative ways. It promotes either a response of managing the system without modifying its trajectory, or of preparing a revolutionary movement, or of waiting passively for it to burst into flames of its own accord. That is, to translate a world-capitalist system into a totality is to misread what is outside it, to miss those things imperfectly incorporated into it, and to present an apolitical orientation to it.

### 2AC Herod Alt

#### Their own author says the alternative fails.

Herod 7 (James, awesome theorist-character, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/5thEd/PrintEd.htm)

We cannot destroy capitalism by dropping out, either as an individual, a small group, or a community. It’s been tried over and over, and it fails every time. There is no escaping capitalism; there is nowhere left to go. The only escape from capitalism is to destroy it. Then we could be free (if we try). In fact, capitalists love it when we drop out. They don’t need us. They have plenty of suckers already. What do they care if we live under bridges, beg for meals, and die young? I haven’t seen the ruling class rushing to help the homeless. Even more illusory than the idea that an individual can drop out is the notion that a whole community can withdraw from the system and build its own little new world somewhere else. This was tried repeatedly by utopian communities throughout the nineteenth century. The strategy was revived in the 1960s as thousands of new left radicals retired to remote rural communes to groove on togetherness (and dope). The strategy is once again surfacing in the new age movement as dozens of communities are being established all over the country. These movements all suffer from the mistaken idea that they don’t have to attack capitalism and destroy it but can simply withdraw from it, to live their own lives separately and independently. It is a vast illusion. Capitalists rule the world. Until they are defeated, there will be no freedom for anyone.

### 2AC Revolution Alt

Alt’s revolutionary framing ignores the adaptability of 21st century capitalism, gets coopted by the system.

De Cock et al, ‘7 [Christian De Cock, Professor of Organization Studies at Swansea University where he also acts as director of the MBA programme. He received his MSc. and PhD. Degrees from the Manchester Business School; Peter Fleming, University Lecturer in Organization Studies at the Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. He has previously held academic posts at Melbourne University (Australia) and Otago University (New Zealand); Alf Rehn, chair of management and organization at Åbo Akademi University, and is a professor of entrepreneurship and innovation at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, AND is a devoted fan of the divine Patsy Cline; “Organizing revolution?”; MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY Vol 2(2), 2007]

Revolution seems a constant in the world of business. Textbooks talk about Taylorism and Fordism as revolutions. Hammer and Champy’s influential book Reengineering the Corporation had as a subtitle A Manifesto for Business Revolution. Guy Kawasaki wrote ‘Rules for Revolutionaries’, and Gary Hamel is ‘Leading the Revolution’. TQM, brands, hair-care products, part-time work and just about every single invention in the field of information technology have been described as revolutionary. All this would come as no great surprise to Marx. To quote (one more time) a famous passage from the Communist Manifesto: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and with them the relations of production… Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones... All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face... the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men (Marx and Engels 1972, 577–8). Capitalism, Marx reminds us, is an inherently transgressive force, perpetually agitating, disrupting, and dissolving; it is a system which can survive only by constantly revolutionizing its own conditions. Capitalism is not just a historical epoch among others: the properly capitalist mode of production ‘reprograms and utterly restructures the values, life rhythms, cultural habits and temporal sense of its subjects’ (Jameson 2005, 284). What is important to point out here is the enthusiastic tone in Marx’s writing; he considers the dynamism of capitalism a crucial force in the dialectical process. Berman (1983, 94) summarized Marx’s thinking thus: The revolutionary activity… that overthrows bourgeois rule will be an expression of the active and activistic energies that the bourgeoisie itself has set free. Marx began by praising the bourgeoisie, not by burying it; but if his dialectic works out, it will be the virtues for which he praised the bourgeoisie that will bury it in the end. Yet, the dialectic hasn’t quite worked out the way Marx expected. In our 21st century capitalist society the notion of revolution has become linked to a uniquely pressing need for stability, thus creating a most peculiar fusion of dynamism and stasis (cf. De Cock et al. 2005, 48–9). As Eagleton (2005, 59) remarks: ‘Revolution is still with us, and its name is the status quo. This social order must square its drive for stability with the fact that, uniquely among historical regimes, its revolution never ends.’ Since the dynamics of capitalism undermine every stable frame of representation, a crucial task that is normally performed by critico-political activity – undermining the representational frame of the dominant ideological form – is already performed by capitalism itself. This poses various problems for scholars of a critical persuasion, succinctly captured by Zˇizˇek’s (2004, 213) question: ‘How, then are we to revolutionize an order whose very principle is constant self-revolutionizing?’ It should come as no great surprise then that the concept of ‘revolution’ has become less and less fashionable in these times of ‘ludic’ postmodern radicalism in academe. If ‘Emancipation almost always means enslavement for something or someone’ (WOBS 2001, xxxiv), is the closest we can approach revolutionary passion a carnivalesque explosion or strategies of resistance? Can a range of forms of resistance based on micro-strategies take the place of a concerted attempt at ‘overthrow’ or a violent act of revolt? Has resistance (e.g. against globalization) become a viable alternative to revolution, or does it merely create regulatory instances that control the worst excesses of capitalism, thus in effect becoming a ‘less important sideshow’ which acts as a safety valve for late-capitalism? Perhaps cynicism about the whole notion of ‘revolution’ is the appropriate response after all? Radical theorists and activists may enjoy a great deal of freedom to do their work – to read, write, speak, meet, organize. But they may find themselves cast in the paradoxical role of merchants and promoters of revolution, which then becomes a commodity like everything else.